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Yevgeniy Pashukanis,  his Law and Marxism: A General Theory, and the 1922 Treaty of 
Rapallo between Soviet Russia and Germany.  
Bill Bowring, Birkbeck College 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores the moment at which Soviet Russia (the USSR came into existence in 
December 1922) made its first and unexpected (as I explain below) step into international 
legal relations on 16 April 1922, the Treaty of Rapallo with Germany. Of particular interest 
to me is the role played, as a Legal Adviser, by Yevgeniy Pashukanis, who, in the West, has 
become the best known Soviet Marxist theorist of law. Pashukanis not only studied in 
Germany before WW I, but for several years after the War worked in the Soviet 
representation in Berlin, preparing his most famous work, Law and Marxism: A General 
Theory. Towards a Critique of the Fundamental Juridical Concepts, in Berlin from 1920 to 
1923.1   
I start with the context for the Treaty of Rapallo, followed by a more detailed account of the 
Treaty and its provisions, drawing on contemporary accounts. I then turn to Yevgeny 
Pashukanis, his background and pre-World War I studies in Germany. I analyse in 
unprecedented detail his central participation in the negotiation of the Treaty. I next turn to 
contemporary evaluation of the Treaty. Then I examine the more controversial question of the 
secret military agreement between Soviet Russia and Germany, whereby Germany was able 
to test new weapons and train military personnel secretly in Soviet Russia, contrary to the 
Versailles Treaty; and Soviet Russia gained the benefit of the latest German military 
technology. I trace the tragic trajectory of Pashukanis up to his murder by Stalin’s regime, 
and conclude with an evaluation of the significance of the Treaty.  
It is my own contention that the General Theory is not at all representative of Pashukanis’s 
work as whole. With the exception of this text, Pashukanis was an orthodox Soviet legal 
scholar, adapting successfully, until he fell victim to Stalin’s purges, to changes in the 
prevailing theoretical and ideological direction of the USSR. The book he prepared in Berlin 
in 1920-1921, completed in 1923 and published in the USSR in 1924 was, in my view, very 
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much an engagement with German legal theory, Kelsen in particular – and perhaps even 
more interesting for that reason. I do not doubt that Pashukanis gave sound legal advice as a 
member of the small Soviet Russian delegation, and indeed, as I show below, he made a 
significant contribution to a wholly unanticipated diplomatic coup by Soviet Russia. And the 
Treaty between two defeated and to different extents pariah powers was of immense 
significance, not only for the immediate survival of Soviet Russia, and its gradual integration 
into the international legal order – the USSR joined the League of Nations on 18 September 
1934 - but also for the subsequent trajectories of both countries.  
2. Soviet Russia and Germany after World War I 
Both Germany and Soviet Russia found themselves isolated, diplomatically and 
economically, from the rest of the world. They were treated as pariahs. 
The Treaty of Rapallo was unexpected, because Soviet Russia had only a few years 
previously capitulated ignominiously to Germany.  On 3 March 1918, it concluded the Treaty 
of Brest-Litovsk with the Central Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and the 
Ottoman Empire), bringing an end to its engagement in World War I. Soviet Russia ceded the 
Russian Empire’s Baltic provinces to Germany, and its province of Kars Oblast in the South 
Caucasus to the Ottoman Empire. Kars is to this day a city in Eastern Turkey. Soviet Russia 
also recognised the independence of Ukraine.2  
However, in 1919, the Red Army defeated the White armed forces of South Russia in 
Ukraine, and the army led by Admiral Kolchak in Siberia. Final victory was achieved 
throughout Russia in 1922. 
Despite victory in the Civil War, Soviet Russia was by no means secure on its Western 
borders. The Polish-Soviet War from late 19193 saw Polish and Ukrainian forces advancing 
far into Ukraine, and the Red Army suffered an unexpected defeat at the Battle of Warsaw in 
August 1920. Soviet Russia was obliged to initiate negotiations, and, on 18 March 1921 the 
Treaty of Riga divided disputed territories between Poland and Soviet Russia. In late 1921 
the remains of the White forces commanded by Pyotr Wrangel were defeated in Crimea and 
evacuated in late 1920, although fighting continued in the east of Russia until 1922. 
The Treaty of Versailles was imposed on a defeated Germany, and the creation of the League 
of Nations. It was signed on June 28, 1919, and under its terms a Secretary-General was 
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named for the League, authorized to organize a permanent staff. By January 10, 1920, the 
necessary ratifications of the treaty had been deposited and the treaty, with the Covenant of 
the League contained in its first 26 articles, became operative. The First Assembly of the 
League met on 15 November 1920. Soviet Russia was regarded as a constituting a “menace”4 
and most certainly did not take part. The USSR did not join the League of Nations until 
1934.5 
Weimar Germany's army was limited to 100,000 men by the Treaty of Versailles, which also 
forbade the Germans to have aircraft, tanks, submarines, heavy artillery, poison gas, anti-tank 
weapons or many anti-aircraft guns. A team of inspectors from the League of Nations 
patrolled many German factories and workshops to ensure that these weapons were not being 
manufactured. 
Relations between Germany and Soviet Russia did not start well. 
The political scientist Ernst Fraenkel6 who emigrated to the USA in 1939 published in 1940 a 
survey of German- Soviet relations during this period.7 He pointed out that the Russian 
ambassador, Adolph Joffe, was expelled from Germany early in November 1918, for 
conspiracy with German communists. The first German Ambassador to Soviet Russia, 
Wilhelm von Mirbach, was shot dead by Russian Left Socialist-Revolutionaries in an alleged 
attempt to incite a new war between Russia and Germany. His successor, the well-known 
German politician Karl Helfferich, left Moscow after a few days. Thus, neither legal nor 
diplomatic relations between Germany and Soviet Russia existed until May 1921.8 On 5 May 
1921, a commercial agreement between them was signed. The political significance of this 
treaty consisted in the act of signing it. By acknowledging the Soviet government as the legal 
representative of the territory it controlled, Germany repudiated any participation in the 
Russian civil war. 
Fraenkel observed that the commercial treaty was planned and drafted by the chief of the 
Eastern Department of the German Foreign Office, Baron von Maltzan, the head of the 
"Eastern School'' of post-war German diplomacy. He also prepared the next step: the Rapallo 
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Treaty of 24 April 1922. In the next section I turn to the composition of the Soviet Russian 
delegation. 
3. Yevgeniy Pashukanis
9
 
Rapallo is of interest for another reason. That was the participation, as a Legal Adviser, of 
Yevgeniy Pashukanis. 
Pashukanis was the best-known and most interesting legal theoretician of the early USSR. He 
was born in 1891. In 1909 he started to study law in Petersburg, but left Russia for Germany 
in 1910. He continued his studies at the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität in Munich, where 
he specialized in the contemporary philosophy of law, and in political economy. His 
dissertation was entitled Statistik der Gesetzwidrigkeit im Arbeitsschutz (Statistics of legal 
infractions in labour protection). This was not at all, therefore, a work of legal theory, but an 
indication of his interest in the workers’ movement in Germany.10 During World War I, he 
returned to Russia.  
In October 1917, following the Bolshevik seizure of power, Pashukanis worked in the 
Sushchevsko-Mariynskiy Military Revolutionary Committee in Moscow, and was later 
elected a member of the Cassation (Appeal) Tribunal attached to the All-Russian Central 
Executive Committee (VTsIK)
11
, acting as a revolutionary judge.
12
  
From 1920 to 1923 Pashukanis served in the Peoples’ Commissariat for Foreign Affairs as 
the deputy head of the Economic Law Department. As a legal adviser, he was involved in one 
of first and most important actions of the young Soviet Union in the field of international law. 
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During this time he worked in the Soviet Russian representation in Berlin, where in due 
course he took part in the preparation of the Rappalo Treaty with Germany. Indeed, on 3 
December 1921 he was the author of a telegram to Georgy Chicherin, People's Commissar 
for Foreign Affairs, on the vexed question of “prize ships”, and styled himself временного 
поверенного (vremennovo poverennovo), Chargé d'Affaires. 13 
In her monumental account of European history following World War I, Zara Steiner 
analysed the context of this work.14 She started with the provisional Russo-German trade 
agreement of May 1921.15 According to her, “[it] was Lenin who plotted the strategies 
pursued at the forthcoming Genoa conference (10 April -19 May 1922), Lloyd George’s 
grand design for the reconstruction of Europe”16, and Lenin personally recruited the members 
of the negotiating delegation17, which included Georgy Chicherin18, who served as People's 
Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government from March 1918 to 1930, Maxim 
Litvinov19, the deputy chief of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, and the former organiser 
of Bolshevik bank robberies, Leonid Krasin20. None of them, unlike Pashukanis, were victims 
of Stalin’s repression. 
According to Steiner, “It was in the hope of strengthening their negotiating hand that 
Chicherin and Litvinov stopped in Berlin in early 1922 on their way to Genoa.”21 There they 
worked very closely with Pashukanis on a number of issues, not only Genoa and Rapallo. 
Indeed, the multi-volume Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR (Documents of the foreign 
policy of the USSR – the Documents) contains a letter dated 17 March 1922 from Maxim 
Litvinov to Yevgeny Pashukanis advising him as to how to deal with the reactionary 
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government of Admiral Miklós Horthy, who came to power after the downfall in 1920 of the 
short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic.22 
In 2001 the Russian historian of Germany G. M. Sadovaya published Walter Rathenau and 
the Rapallo Treaty.23 She relates that in February 1922 Soviet-German negotiations started 
again. However, the Germans did not want to talk about credits for the RSFSR24 referring to 
their own need for money and their anxiety about interference from the Reparations 
Commission.  
But contacts continued. Sadovaya notes that Karl Radek participated in these discussions, 
together with the representative of Soviet Russia in Germany N. N. Krestinsky, the chairman 
of the Ukrainian SSR, Kh. G. Rakovsky, and the trade representative of the RSFSR in Berlin, 
B. S. Stomonyakov25, with his adviser, Yevgeny Pashukanis. Information about the 
negotiations in January-February 1922 can be found in a number of sources: the letter of G. 
V. Chicherin of 10 April summarising what was going on; the account of “the Soviet 
diplomat Ye. V. Pashukanis” and other sources.26  
Sadovaya relates that on the evening of 1 April 1922 there was a crucial meeting of the 
Soviet delegation with Radek, Stomonyakov and Pashukanis.27 They decided to separate 
negotiations concerning political recognition, from negotiations about possible loans for the 
RSFSR. It was necessary to include in the political agreement the restoration of diplomatic 
relations and full mutual withdrawal of claims, including any claims for reparations for 
damage done to Germany in Russia in the course of nationalisation. It is plain that Pashukanis 
as Adviser to the Soviet Russian diplomats played a key role in arriving at this decision.  
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A detailed account of this meeting was given by Pashukanis in his Telegram of 5 April 1922 
“from the Adviser of the Representation of the RSFSR in Germany to the Peoples 
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs RFSFR”.28 This is also to be found online.29 
The Soviet delegation focused its energy on the attempt to get everything signed before 
leaving for Genoa. Pashukanis wrote that this question was raised at breakfast with Rathenau 
and in meetings which took place for almost the whole day on 3 April, from 10 am to 5 pm. 
In discussion with Rathenau, wrote Pashukanis, a compromise formula began to take on more 
defined and correct – for the Russian delegation – features. Namely, in the agreement it must 
be stated that Germany relinquishes all claims relating to nationalisation, on condition that 
the Soviet Russian side rejected similar claims of other states.  
4. The impact and consequences of the Treaty of Rapallo 
Indeed, the result of the astute brinkmanship of the Soviet Russian delegation, was what 
Steiner described as a “bombshell”, especially for Lloyd George.30 
Carole Fink also emphasised the crucial importance of the preliminary negotiations in 
Berlin.31 She noted32 that “At 6.30 pm on 16 April [1922], the foreign ministers of Germany 
and Russia signed the “Rapallo Treaty”… Contrary to the Allies’ programme for Genoa, 
Germany had accorded Soviet Russia full and unconditional recognition.” She continued 
“The treaty represented a lopsided Soviet victory, caused by a combination of deceitfulness 
and ambition. Litvinov gloated to Moscow: “Our semi-private talks with the Supreme 
Council [sic] aroused fears in the minds of the Germans, and Rathenau, neither alive nor 
dead, came running to us yesterday and proposed right on the spot the same agreement which 
he refused to sign during our stay in Berlin.”33 
Pashukanis was one of the authors of this success 
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5. Contemporary evaluation of Rapallo 
In 1922 the Treaty of Rapallo was mentioned in the American Journal of International Law 
as follows: “Political treaty signed at Rapallo by which Germany recognized the Soviet 
government de jure: German claims in respect to private property nationalized by Bolshevists 
were waived; German and Russian debts were mutually cancelled, diplomatic relations were 
renewed, etc.”34 
The Treaty of Rapallo was strictly speaking a by-product of the Genoa Economic 
Conference, signed by Walter Rathenau and Georgy Chicherin at the Hotel Imperiale in the 
Italian city of Genoa on 16 April 1922 between Germany and Soviet Russia.  
According to Articles I and II of the Treaty, all mutual claims between the two countries were 
annulled; Article III restored full diplomatic relations; Article IV introduced the most 
favoured nation clause into the commercial dealings of the two parties; and in Article V the 
German government declared its readiness to encourage trade between German industry and 
Soviet Russia.35  
On 5 November 1922 a Supplementary Agreement was signed by “the plenipotentiary of the 
German Government, namely Freiherr von Maltzan, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs; the plenipotentiary of the Socialist Soviet Republic of the Ukraine, namely, Herr 
Waldemar Aussem, Member of the Central Executive Committee for all Ukraine, and also 
the plenipotentiary of the Government of the Socialist Soviet Republic of White Russia, the 
Socialist Soviet Republic of Georgia, the Socialist Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan, the 
Socialist Soviet Republic of Armenia, and the Republic of the Far East, namely Herr 
Nikolaus Krestinski, plenipotentiary and Ambassador of the Russian Socialist Soviet 
Republic in Berlin”. 36 
In his 1940 article referred to above, Ernst Fraenkel observed that  
The Rapallo Treaty was the first big surprise created by German diplomacy in the 
post-war period. For some days the treaty, concluded during the Genoa Conference, 
was considered a threat to the European peace. The nightmare of a German-Russian 
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war alliance appeared on the stage. Both countries were branded as saboteurs of the 
first attempt of the post-war period to establish a real peace.37 
He continued: 
The advantage realized by Germany and Russia was considerable. Both nations had 
demonstrated their independence; they boasted of having concluded the only treaty 
worthy of being called a "peace" treaty in the post-war period. The resolution of the 
All-Russian Central Executive Committee, May 18, 1922, reads: 
"The All-Russian Central Executive Committee welcomes the German-
Russian treaty concluded at Rapallo as the only true issue from chaos and the 
danger of war, recognizes no other type of treaty as normal for relations 
between the R.S.F.S.R. and the capitalist states."38 
Pashukanis’ rival, Yevgeniy Korovin, published an article in the American Journal of 
International Law in 1928, “Soviet Treaties and International Law”39. On the question of 
Rapallo, Korovin focused first on the Treaty of Rapallo for its “most favoured nation 
clause”:40 
Article 16 of the provisional Russo-German agreement of May 6, 1921, proclaims 
"the spirit of mutual benevolence which should strengthen economic ties." Articles 8 
and 9 guarantee Russian citizens "the prescriptions of international law and of the 
German common law." Comparing this convention with Article 4 of the Treaty of 
Rapallo (April 16, 1922), making provisions for the application of the principle of the 
most favoured nation to the laws affecting foreigners and to the commercial relations 
of the two states, we find, in Article 4, that the clause becomes operative only from 
the day of the ratification of this diplomatic instrument, which is sufficient evidence 
that this principle had, prior thereto, been absent. 
He emphasised in conclusion
41
 the memorial presented by the Soviet Delegation, setting out 
the principles of the Soviet side. This is worth setting out in extenso:  
In the memorial presented by the Soviet Delegation at Genoa, April 20, 1922, is set 
forth the following thesis: 
The revolution of 1917, having completely destroyed all the old relationships, 
economic, social and political, and having replaced the old social order (class 
divisions) by the new social order, the sovereignty of an insurgent people, 
turning over the power of the Russian State to a new social class, did by this 
fact break the succession of those civil obligations which were component 
elements of the economic relations of the social order now extinct. 
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The train of argument adopted by the Soviets is somewhat as follows: Every 
international agreement is the expression of an established social order, with a certain 
balance of collective interests. So long as this social order endures, such treaties as 
remain in force, following the principle, pacta sunt servanda, must be scrupulously 
observed. But if in the storm of a social cataclysm one class replaces the other at the 
helm of the state, for the purpose of reorganizing not only economic ties but the 
governing principles of internal and external politics, the old agreements, insofar as 
they reflect the pre-existing order of things, destroyed by the revolution, become null 
and void. To demand of a people at last freed of the yoke of centuries the payment of 
debts contracted by their oppressors for the purpose of holding them in slavery would 
be contrary to those elementary principles of equity which are due all nations in their 
relations with each other. Thus in this sense the Soviet Doctrine appears to be an 
extension of the principle of rebus sic stantibus, while at the same time limiting its 
field of application by a single circumstance – the social revolution. 
Korovin seemed to have been anxious to show that the revolutionary Russian approach to 
international law could be understood within the traditional framework of international law. It 
is perhaps no accident that he did not acknowledge the crucial role played by his rival for 
leadership of Soviet international law, Yevgeny Pashukanis. 
Moreover, it may well be that Pashukanis’s experience as a responsible working diplomat, 
engaged in negotiation at the highest level, informed his later writing to a much greater extent 
than did his German-centred theoretical scholarship. 
6. Pashukanis’s scholarly work while in Berlin 
However, as he disclosed rather later, in 1930, it was while in the Berlin in 1921-22, that 
Pashukanis prepared his General Theory, which was completed in 1923 and appeared in 
1924. He also published his first scholarly article in 1921.  
The Selected Works of Pashukanis published in Russia in 1980
42
 has a Bibliography
43
 of the 
“Fundamental Works of Pashukanis”; but one work is missing. This was Pashukanis’ first 
published article, which appeared in 1921, and was entitled “Burzhuazniy yurist o prirode 
gosudarstvo (A bourgeois jurist on the nature of the state)”.44 It appeared in the literary 
journal Krasnaya Nov (Red Virgin Soil), which was the first Soviet literary “thick” journal, 
published between 1921 and 1941. From 1921 to 1927 it was edited by Aleksandr Voronkov 
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(1884-1937), who was close to Trotsky, agreed with Trotsky’s 1923 Literature and 
Revolution, did much to encourage new literary talent, and in 1937 was executed for 
Trotskyism.  
The subject of the article was the scholarship of Professor Maurice Hauriou of the University 
of Toulouse (1856-1929)
45
, whose textbook on Principles of Public Law was published in 
1910. Pashukanis did not refer in his 4,000 word article to any other literature. Not least in 
this regard, the article contrasts strongly with the General Theory, which has many 
references, including several to German authors. He referred to Marx, but without indicating 
his source. Most of the article consisted of often sarcastic references to Hauriou’s positivist 
doctrine. Pashukanis’ concluding paragraph was as follows.46 
In one of his speeches Cde Lenin remarked that sincere defenders of capitalism may 
now be found only among our SRs (Social Revolutionaries) and Mensheviks. In the 
West they have become extinct. We can see the cause of this. Russia underwent an 
accelerated course of capitalism and therefore our intelligentsia may bona fide come 
out in defence of the sublime beginning of democracy and freedom, without sensing 
that it has been crucified by capitalism. But in order to be a sincere defender of 
capitalism in the West, where social relations have been able to mature and over-
mature, one must sincerely, like Hauriou, assert that the principles of freedom, 
democracy, individual rights and so on, conceal behind themselves quite simply faire 
valoir de la propriété!
47
 And such courage is not given to everyone. 
There is in fact a connection between Pashukanis’ sole publication before the General 
Theory, his 1921 article, and the 1924 General Theory itself, although Pashukanis did not 
refer directly to his earlier work. In fact, Maurice Hauriou was cited three times
48
 in the 
General Theory, but this time with approbation and the epithet “astute” as in“one of the most 
astute bourgeois theorists”49 and “an astute jurist like Hauriou”.50 And there are many 
references to the German legal scholars whom Pashukanis read in Munich and during his 
time in Berlin. 
However, Pashukanis’ paramount reason for writing the General Theory was not to renew or 
explain his relationship with Hauriou, but to identify “…law in its general definition, law as a 
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form...”.51  That is, to tackle the question of the nature of law as a materially grounded 
abstraction. Pashukanis is now best known for his “commodity-form” theory of law, more 
recently extended to a “commodity-form theory of international law”.52 
In the first of several recantations of his work in 1921, published in 1930, Pashukanis wrote 
the following about the genesis of the General Theory: 
It is clear that much which was written in the first years of NEP53 deserves criticism 
and suffers from obvious anachronisms and now and then simply mistakes… But the 
question is not only that of particular formulations. The question concerns some 
defects of a general character. This was the overestimation of the role and significance 
of market relations which was without doubt characteristic of my first work. It is 
impermissible to hide from view the fact that this book was written at a time when the 
collective of Marxist legal scholars had not come together. It was written when I was 
alone, and it could not be exposed to the process of critical re-working. It was written 
finally, before the publication of Lenin’s notebooks on dialectics and on the works of 
Marx which were published in the “Archive”. It appeared before the discussions with 
the “mechanists”, before the discussions in the fields of political economy, literature 
etc. Therefore it was completely natural, that the book, which was written in 1923, 
and prepared still earlier in 1920-1921, displays defects, when we look at it from our 
higher present day theoretical and methodological point of view.
54
 
This concerned Pashukanis’ theoretical work from 1920 to 1923.  
There was  another side to Rapallo. 
7. The secret military agreement at (or behind) Rapallo 
In 1922 Soviet Russia and Germany concluded a much more controversial and indeed secret 
agreement. The military historian Gordon Mueller wrote in 1976
55
: 
This treaty commands our attention if only because it was the first of its kind to be 
signed by either of the two great outcast nations of Europe after Versailles. In April 
1922, the effect of the treaty exploded like a bombshell on European nations. The 
political and psychological shock of the treaty was heightened by rumors running 
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rampant through Genoa and the world that Rapallo included a secret military 
agreement. 
Mueller provided convincing evidence that there was indeed a secret military agreement 
between the Soviet Union and Germany.  
… the Reichstag expose of December 1926 publicly confirmed that the Reichswehr 
and German industry had indeed been secretly cooperating for some years.  
Mueller contended that “even without the Rapallo connection, Germany's entire military 
relationship to Russia, already in 1922, was far more extensive, more politically involved, 
and more important than previously thought.” The text of the reported military convention 
between Soviet Russia and Germany was published at Riga and reprinted in the London 
Times on 6 May 1922, and Mueller reproduced it as Appendix 1 to his very thoroughly 
referenced article.56 He concluded: 
In summing up the arguments for a secret military agreement connected with Rapallo, 
we can say the following. Secret military and armament agreements with Russia were 
concluded both before and after Rapallo was signed but could easily have received 
some semi-official recognition in the treaty itself. Certainly, the bulk of the evidence 
favors some relationship of Rapallo to these subterranean military arrangements, a 
relationship so carefully guarded that to this very day mystery obscures many of the 
details.57 
Hans Gatzke in his 1958 study of Russo-German military collaboration58, drawing on 
contemporaneous letters and other materials,  discounted the idea of a secret treaty at Rapallo, 
but reported on negotiations whose purpose “… was to reach some agreement by which 
Germany would provide financial and technical aid in building up Russia's armament 
industry (with possible concessions to German firms, such as Junkers and Krupp) and obtain 
from Russia the necessary artillery ammunition that she was prohibited from manufacturing 
under the Treaty of Versailles.59” He therefore contended that “… there is evidence that the 
German military, in their simultaneous negotiations  with Russia, were going far beyond what 
their government was ready to concede”.60 He concluded that “If there is one thing the 
German documents show, it is the fact that the whole German government and not merely its 
military branch was actively involved in the collaboration with Russia.”61 
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In 1928 Yan Karlovich Berzin, a Latvian (Latvian name Jānis K. Bērziņš) Soviet military 
intelligence officer62 wrote a top secret report on “cooperation with Germany”.63 This 
confirmed the very extensive cooperation between the Reichswehr and the Red Army, and 
contracts with the Junkers firm for military planes as well as the construction of aviation 
factories in Russia, and contracts from the Reichswehr for the mutual construction of 
factories for the manufacture of mustard gas.  
More information on the secret military side of Rapallo has been set out, with considerable 
detail, in a book published in Russia in 2000, The German Contribution in the History of 
Russian Aviation.64 The chapter “The Lipetsk secret aviation school” has been published on 
the internet.65 According to the authors, the first step was taken under Lenin in 1920 when the 
German authorities approached the Soviet Russian government with a proposal for the 
establishment on Russian territory of German military flying courses. The Politburo 
approved, save that rather than Moscow the training should take place in a provincial city. 
The Bolsheviks wanted to take advantage of German military experience and also modern 
technology. Above all, the Soviet leadership wanted to attract German industrialists to restore 
Russia’s military potential.  
On 11 August 1922, soon after the signing of the Rapallo Treaty, a secret agreement was 
signed by the Reichswehr and the Red Army for cooperation. Germany was able to organise 
in Russia the testing of military equipment and training of personnel forbidden by the 
Versailles Treaty, and the Germans promised to export equipment to Russia and, most 
importantly, to participate in the testing of new German aircraft, tanks and chemical weapons.  
German specialists arrived in Russia in 1924, and in June 1925 the steamship ‘Hugo Stinnes 
IV’ sailed from Stettin to Leningrad with 50 crates containing Fokker D XIII fighters, 
delivered to the air training school in Lipetsk. Cooperation continued until 1933. 
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Another, very controversial, contribution to scholarship concerning the secret Rapallo 
agreement, appeared in Russia in 1992 66 and was published in English in 1995, entitled The 
Red Army and the Wehrmacht: How the Soviets militarized Germany, 1922-1933, and paved 
the way for Fascism (From the Secret Archives of the Former Soviet Union).67  According to 
the authors, the documents reveal that the foundation of Hitler's army was put together with 
the cooperation of the upper echelon of the Red Army and the Soviet Politburo, including 
Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin. This unspoken alliance, which changed the course of world 
history, has remained a secret - until now, they say. The authors believed that they make a 
convincing case that had it not been for Soviet aid, Hitler's military buildup would not have 
been possible and World War II might well have been averted. But from 2004 onwards their 
thesis – a classic conspiracy theory - has come in for considerable critical attention. 68 
On balance, the agreement is likely to have benefited Soviet Russia at least as much as it did 
Germany. As the Soviet Russians anticipated, they gained access to modern technologies and 
methods. 
8. Pashukanis’s later trajectory 
Pashukanis became in the next ten years a staunch loyalist of the regime – in my opinion, by 
conviction rather than any sort of pressure.  
In 1931, following the dramatic recantation of his previous views noted above, Pashukanis 
became the Director of the Institute of Soviet Construction and Law of the Communist 
Academy. He was effectively the USSR’s director of legal research and legal education. The 
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American scholar John Hazard69, who studied under Pashukanis from 1934 to 1937, 
summarised his effect on legal education, as follows:
70
  
Believing that the state was slowly withering away as socialism came nearer to 
achievement, Pashukanis advocated the cessation of courses in civil law. He 
understood civil law to be the regulation of the relations of men under the trading 
conditions of capitalism, and, as such, no longer of importance, as the remnants of 
capitalism disappeared. 
His influence was so marked that the courses in civil law in the law school were 
abolished, and to replace them there appeared a course called economic-
administrative law, concerning itself with regulation of the relations between state 
enterprises.
71
 
Following Pashukanis’ fall in 1937, courses on (Soviet) civil law were reintroduced to the 
syllabus.  
By 1932, Pashukanis, who had become editor in chief of the official law journal Soviet State, 
was able to write a “hallelujah” in response to Stalin’s letter “Some questions on the history 
of Bolshevism”.72 Pashukanis’ major work on international law, Essays in International Law, 
appeared in 1935
73
.  
Most copies of the Essays were destroyed after he was denounced in 1937, but in this 
culminating work he declared that any attempt to define the “nature of international law” was 
scholastic.
74
 In his view, such attempts were the result of the continuing influence of 
bourgeois legal methodology, which, he said, rested on the association of law with substance 
developing in accordance with its own internal principles. For him, in 1935, international law 
was a means of formulating and strengthening, in custom and treaties, various political and 
economic relationships between states; the USSR could use international law to further 
Soviet interests in the struggle with capitalist states. He saw no reason to believe that in using 
these principles of international law for its own purposes the USSR was compromising its 
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principles, in a world in which most states were capitalist. For Pashukanis there was no point 
in seeking to determine whether international law was “bourgeois” or “socialist”; such a 
discussion would be “scholastic”.75  
The entry on International Law was included in full as an Appendix in China Miéville’s 
Between Equal Rights, which is probably the most notable contemporary rehabilitation of 
Pashukanis.
76
 However, Miéville noticed that in contrast to the General Theory, Pashukanis 
seemed “to accept the existence of antique international law, and to deny its historical 
particularity.”77 That is, it would appear that there is no law as such until capitalism, and only 
private law; but there has been international law throughout recorded history. Pashukanis 
rejected the positivist arguments of Austin and others that without a sovereign there can be no 
international law. Even for the young USSR there could be international law: 
The formalization of our relationship with bourgeois states, by way of treaties, is part 
of our foreign policy, and is its continuation in a special form. A treaty obligation is 
nothing other than a special form of the concretization of economic and political 
relationships. But once the appropriate degree of concretization is reached, it may 
then be taken into consideration and, within certain limits, studied as a special subject. 
The reality of this object is no less than the reality of any constitution – both may be 
overturned by the intrusion of a revolutionary squall.
78
 
Pashukanis, unlike later Soviet jurists, did not oppose the existence of customary 
international law as a source of international law, which, he said, was “…the totality of norms 
regulating the relationships between states.”79 He continued: “To the extent that states have 
no external authority above them which could establish their norms of conduct, then in the 
technical legal sense the sources of international law are custom and treaty.”80  
This was noted in 1970 by G. I. Tunkin, the leading international legal scholar of the late 
Soviet period, who gave these passages of Pashukanis as evidence that Soviet international 
law had not rejected general (customary) international law.
81
 Tunkin pointed out that when 
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Pashukanis in 1935 stated that with the help of international law the bourgeois states “divide 
the loot”82, this was the “old”, pre WWII international law.83  
Pashukanis, as an international legal practitioner, an author of the Rapallo Treaty, was 
perfectly comfortable with orthodox conceptions of international law. 
On 16 November 1936 Pashukanis reached the high point of his career: the Presidium of the 
Central Executive Committee of the USSR appointed him Deputy Peoples Commissar for 
Justice of the USSR. In the same year he was deputy chairman of the Drafting Committee for 
the 1936 “Stalin Constitution”84, and the Institute of State and Law proposed him as a 
candidate for membership of the Academy of Science of the USSR. Also in 1936 he became 
the chairman of the Academic Council attached to the Peoples Commissariat of Justice of the 
USSR.  
But within a year he was dead, following Pravda’s announcement on 20 January 1937 that he 
had been found to be an enemy of the people – just two months after he had been named by 
the regime to supervise the revision of the whole system of Soviet codes of law. On the same 
day he was arrested. On 4 September 1937 a Military Collegium sentenced him to death.  He 
was condemned as a member of a ‘band of wreckers’ and “Trotsky-Bukharin fascist agents”. 
He was posthumously rehabilitated in 1956.  
9. Conclusion – the significance of Rapallo 
I have referred above to some more contemporary evaluations of the Treaty of Rapallo. How 
do Russians now see the events of 1922 and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk? The historian G. M. 
Sadovaya, in her 2001 book cited above, wrote that the Treaty of Rapallo created the legal 
basis for the establishment of multi-faceted relations between the two countries and above all 
for providing the basis for economic cooperation.85 Their diplomatic relations were also 
regulated. The Soviet Russian government appointed its representative in Berlin with a new 
rank, of Plenipotentiary Ambassador.  This was the Bolshevik revolutionary N. N. 
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Krestinsky86, who was already well known in Germany. On 2 August 1922 he presented his 
credentials, which he had received not from the head of a government but from the head of a 
state, to President Ebert of Germany. More than 100,000 German workers came to the Soviet 
Embassy, to welcome the Treaty and the official Soviet Russian presence in Berlin. 
Sadovaya’s conclusion as to the Treaty of Rapallo is as follows: 
The Treaty has been called a phantom, an episode, a dream, a secret, a ghost, a bluff, 
an instrument of political tactics, it has been hinted that there was a military alliance 
between the two countries, emphasising that Russia used Germany, and so on… [in 
her view] it was never a minor tactical manoeuvre, but a great political conception, 
and never a secret alliance.87 
In the history of Soviet and Russian approaches to international law, the Treaty of Rapallo is 
also inextricably linked to the professional activity and theoretical evolution of Yevgeniy 
Pashukanis, one of the most interesting, and tragic, leading actors of the inter-War period. 
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